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This article studies and measures the gains from openness and
the e⁄ects of international trade policy on productivity and output
levels. It is assumed an economy with two tradable and non-storable
intermediate goods, used in the production of a non-tradable ￿nal
good. The solution of the static trade and factor allocation problem
generates implicitly a mapping between factor endowments and ￿nal
output, which is then used as an exogenous production function. We
￿nd that for very poor economies gains from trade are sizable and in
many cases more than 50% of their per capita income. Most of these
countries have high tari⁄s but enjoy most of their potential gains from
trade as their factor endowment is very di⁄erent from that of the rich
countries that they trade with. However, there are a group of low-
to-middle income countries (e.g., India and Pakistan), with sizeable
potential gains from trade, and for whom barriers to trade imply a
signi￿cant loss.
1 Introduction
We study and measure the e⁄ects of international trade policy on total factor
productivity (TFP) and output levels. We use as our main instrument a dy-
namic Hecksher-Ohlin model that follows, among others, Ferreira and Trejos
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1(2006). In this framework, it is assumed an economy with two tradable and
non-storable intermediate goods, used in the production of a non-tradable
￿nal good. We focus on the case of a small, price-taking economy. The so-
lution of the static trade and factor allocation problem generates implicitly
a mapping between factor endowments and ￿nal output, which can then be
used as an exogenous production function. This formulation is similar to Cor-
den (1971), Trejos (1992) and Ventura (1997) that use a factor-endowments
framework to introduce trade in a macro model.
In this model, policy instruments that increase the cost of international
trade generate an ine¢ cient equilibrium allocation of factors across indus-
tries. This ine¢ ciency has an e⁄ect similar to a fall in total factor produc-
tivity.
We ￿rst use this framework to measure the static gains from trade assum-
ing a move from autarky to free trade. Under a very conservative calibration
we show that for a country with around one per cent of the capital-labor ratio
of the rich economies (e.g. Mozambique and Rwanda in our sample) these
potential gains from trade area sizable, reaching 75% of their own output.
We them apply observed tari⁄data to measure what portion of these poten-
tial gains are actually being enjoyed. The answer depends on the magnitude
of the trade barriers and also on the relative capital-labor ratio, a fact not
always observed in the literature. For instance, in 1985 Brazil and Benin had
similar nominal tari⁄rates (unweighted averages). However, while the latter
realized almost all its potential gains from trade, Brazil lost almost them all.
This is because capital-labor ratio in Benin is only, on average, 4% of the
rich economies it trade with, while in Brazil it was 57%. However, there are
a group of low-to-middle income countries (e.g., India and Pakistan), with
sizeable potential gains from trade, and for whom barriers to trade imply a
signi￿cant loss.
These results compare with those in the "pure trade part" (i.e., the model
without di⁄usion) of Rodriguez-Clare (2006), who also found sizable gains
for very poor economies. However, they contrast with those in Eaton and
Kurtun (2002) because, by construction, the gains from trade between two
rich economies in our model are small, while they found relatively large gains.
As opposed to the previous development accounting literature1, we are
not worried whether TFP or factors are more relevant in explaining output
1See for instance, Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997),
Prescott (1998) and Hall and Jones (1999).
2di⁄erences. Instead, we perform output decompositions from a distinctive
perspective. The fact that countries with very di⁄erent factor endowments
to the rich economies are trading with them, and obtaining a productivity
gain from that trade (that is not enjoyed by the richer nations, at least not
in a similar scale), implies that TFP decompositions that ignore the e⁄ects
of this type of trade would yield a higher TFP residual for many nations;
perhaps quite a bit higher, as suggested by the gains from trade numbers.
We measure this di⁄erence and show that for a group of poor economies
the TFP constructed ignoring trade in general overestimate the true TFP.
For instance, while in a closed economy model productivity would explain
32.4% of the income di⁄erence of Mozambique with respect to the leading
economies, once we correct for the gains from trade - which are huge in this
case - the TFP residual explains only 18.2% of the income disparity.
This article has four sessions in addition to this introduction. The next
session presents the model used in our development decomposition exercises,
while session three discusses data and calibration. Session four presents the
main results and session ￿ve concludes.
2 The model
The model follows Ferreira and Trejos (2006). Time is discrete and un-
bounded. The world contains many countries, one of which is a large econ-
omy that has converged to its steady state, and that we will call the Center.
Other countries are small relative to the Center, in the sense that they are
price-takers at the Center·s autarkic price. Our representative country is
populated by a continuum of identical, in￿nitely-lived individuals. Three
goods are produced: two non-storable, tradable intermediate products, A
and B, and a a ￿nal good, Y , which can be consumed or invested, but that
cannot be traded. There are also two factors of production in this economy:
labor in e¢ cient units H and physical capital K. Labor and capital are
used in producing A and B, and these in turn are used to produce Y . The
endowment of labor, measured in e¢ ciency units, is given by:
H = Lh = Le
￿s;
where L is the number of workers, h represents e¢ ciency-units of labor per











Without loss of generality, A is labor-intensive: ￿a < ￿b. We use B as
numeraire, with the prices of A and Y denoted p and ￿. All markets are
perfectly competitive; in the case of intermediate products, these are not
domestic markets but rather a single world market, from which local Y pro-
ducers can import intermediate products provided they pay an ad-valorem
tari⁄￿. This ￿ captures all the (policy or non-policy induced) costs of bring-
ing imported intermediate products into the local market.
Because intermediate goods are tradable, the amounts of them that are
used in the production of the ￿nal good (denoted by lowercase a and b) may




where ￿ is total factor productivity.
We derive the allocation of capital K and labor H among the production
of A and B, the quantities a and b of intermediate goods used domestically,
and the amount of ￿nal output Y that is produced. Because intermediate
goods are assumed to be non-storable, and the ￿nal good is not tradable,
this is a static problem, which yields an equilibrium mapping
Y = ￿F(K;Hj￿;p)
that relates ￿nal output with factor endowments. This mapping is not a
production function, in the sense that it does not describe a technology: it
describes an equilibrium relationship that takes into account the technologies
for all the products, and the equilibrium e⁄ects of trade in the intermediate
inputs in the optimal choice for ￿nal good producers.
The equilibrium solutions for fA;B;a;b;q;w;r;Ki;Hig must satisfy the
following properties:
1. Producers of intermediate goods choose Ki;Hi in order to maximize














B ￿ wHB ￿ rKB






1￿￿ ￿ qa ￿ b
3. Firms make zero pro￿ts,
￿a
￿b
1￿￿ = qa + b
qA = wHA + rKA
B = wHB + rKB
markets clear,
K = KA + KB
H = HA + HB
and agents neither borrow from nor lend to the world economy,
pA + B = pa + b
4. Local prices of tradable goods satisfy an after-tari⁄ law of one price:
q =
￿
p=(1 + ￿) if a < A
p ￿ (1 + ￿) if b > B :
Based on these requisites, one can derive the equilibrium relationship F.
As is standard in the Hecksher-Ohlin model:
1. If K=H is much lower [much higher] than the world￿ s ratio (K=H)
￿,
only the intermediate good A [B] will be produced, as its production
uses more intensively the relatively abundant labor [capital]. There are
critical levels s1 < (K=H)
￿ and z2 > (K=H)
￿ such that if K=H ￿ s1
then the country only produces A, and if K=H ￿ z2 then the country
only produces B: Then, Y is a Cobb-Douglas function of K and H,
with capital share ￿a [￿b]. Furthermore, the critical values s1 and z2
are sensitive to ￿. In particular, with higher tari⁄s the economy is less
prone to specialize, so @s1=@￿ < 0 [@z2=@￿ > 0], with s1 ! 0 [z2 ! 1]
as ￿ ! 1:
52. If K=H is very close to (K=H)
￿ a high enough tari⁄ will make the
economy not trade at all: There exist x1 and x2, where s1 < x1 ￿
(K=H)
￿ and (K=H)
￿ ￿ x2 < z2 such that if (K=H) 2 (x1;x2) then
there is no trade, so a = A, b = B: We have: @x1=@￿ < 0 and @x2=@￿ >
0. Also, x1 ! 0 and x2 ! 1 as ￿ ! 1, while x1 = x2 if ￿ = 0.
3. If K=H is neither too close nor too far from (K=H)
￿, the economy will
produce both intermediate goods, yet still trade. In those cases holds
a result analogous to the Factor Price Equalization Theorem, which
states that equilibrium marginal returns of capital and labor are not
sensitive to small variations in the factor endowment. What that means
is that ￿nal output Y is linear in K and H when K=H 2 [s1;x1] or
when K=H 2 [x2;z2].
Hence, the equilibrium relationship from K and H to Y takes the form
F(K;Hj￿;p) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
￿1K￿aH1￿￿a if K=H < s1
￿2K + ￿3H if K=H 2 [s1;x1]
￿4K￿H1￿￿ if K=H 2 [x1;x2]
￿5K + ￿6H if K=H 2 [x2;z2]
￿7K￿bH1￿￿b if K=H > z2;
where the values ￿i are functions of parameters, and are a⁄ected by p and
￿: For a closed economy it is the case that [x1;x2) = <+. Consequently, with-
out trade our model simply collapses to one with the aggregate production
function is Y = ￿F ￿(K;Hj￿;p) = ￿￿4K￿H1￿￿; for ￿ = ￿￿a + (1 ￿ ￿)￿b:
For all values of p and ￿, F is homogeneous of degree one and continuous in
K and H. F is decreasing in ￿ (strictly decreasing if k = 2 [x1;x2]):
The fact that @F==@￿ < 0 implies that a more liberal trade policy carries
as a consequence a gain in output, given inputs. Hence, if one ignores the
e⁄ects of trade, one may attribute them to ￿. The e⁄ect of ￿ on output is
not because tari⁄s appear directly in any of the production functions, but
rather because trade changes domestic prices, q; in a way that expands the
set of choices producers have for their inputs.
The e⁄ects of trade on measured productivity will vary according to the
capital labor ratio k = K=H. A country with low k, much lower than the
Center, will derive large gains from trade, and thus also lose much from a high
￿. A more capital-rich country, where k is similar to that of the Center, has
less to bene￿t from trade as international prices will resemble more closely
its autarkic prices.
63 Data and calibration
In what follows, we try to assess the impact of the gains from trade on
measured productivity for a large set of countries. We use the Penn-World
Tables (PWT) data for output per worker and to construct the physical
capital series using the Perpetual Inventory Method. The initial capital
stock, K0; was approximated by K0 = I0=[(1 + g)(1 + n) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)], where I0
is the initial investment expenditure, g is the rate of technological progress
and n is the growth rate of the population. In this calculation it is assumed
that all economies were in a balanced growth path at time zero, so that
I￿j = (1 + n)
￿j (1 + g)
￿j I0.
We use the same depreciation rate for all economies, which was calculated
from US data. We employed the capital stock at market prices, investment
at market prices, I, as well as the law of motion of capital to estimate the
implicit depreciation rate according to:




From this calculation, we obtained ￿ = 3:5% per year (average of the 1950-
2000 period). To minimize the impact of economic ￿ uctuations we used the
average investment of the ￿rst ￿ve years as a measure of I0. When data was
available we started this procedure taking 1950 as the initial year in order to
reduce the e⁄ect of K0 in the capital stock series.
For human capital, we use a standard Mincer function of schooling, of
the form h = e￿s. Following Psacharopoulos (1994), we set the return of
schooling to ￿ = 0:099. We used data on the average educational attainment
of the population aged 15 years and over, taken from Barro and Lee (2000).
For trade policy we use several data sources. The only uniform estimates
for a large sample of countries that we know of is World Bank (2005) data
on average tari⁄rates (unweighted). The calculations in the next section are
done using those numbers for ￿. Of course, there are problems with this.
First, unweighted averages usually include the very low tari⁄s that most
countries have for their export goods, which are rarely also imported. This
drives down the average. Second, as extensively documented in the survey by
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), the costs associated with international
trade include, besides tari⁄s, a series of policy-induced non-tari⁄ barriers,
plus costs related to transportation and distance, the latter two exceeding
the tari⁄ for many products and countries, according to several estimates.
7However, no uniform measurement or estimation of these other costs for a
large sample of countries seems to exist. Hence, we perform our analysis
mostly with the large dataset that contains only average tari⁄s, and later
contrast it with the estimates of other trade barriers for a small group of
countries that have been estimated elsewhere. The references behind this
appear below.
For callibration, we use the sum of the European Union and the United
States for k and h in the Center, getting p as the autarkic relative price of
A for a closed economy with those levels of capital.2
As is conventional, we match the capital share of a closed economy to be
￿ = 1=3: This pins down the average ￿, but leaves freedom in choosing ￿,
￿a and ￿b. These parameters are particularly important, as the quantitative
e⁄ects of all trade-related phenomena, for low k, are bound to be larger with
a big spread ￿b ￿ ￿a, and with a lower ￿, given ￿: We choose conservatively
the values of ￿a, ￿b and ￿ to limit the size of the gains from trade within
reasonable bounds. These parameters are chosen so that exports cannot
amount to more than half of output, and so that for the countries about to
enter the EU in 1985 (Portugal and Spain), or any richer nation, the potential
gains from trade (the di⁄erence in output between ￿ = 1 and ￿ = 0) are
at most 1% of GDP. This leads to ￿ = 1=2, ￿a = 0:19 and ￿b = 0:408. We
analyze below the e⁄ects on our results from varying ￿a:
4 Results
We ￿rst assess the potential and realized gains from trade, which are shown
in Tables 1.1 to 1.4. Column (3) shows what our model predicts in terms of
the output di⁄erence between ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 1, given each country·s levels
of schooling and capital:
F(K;Hj￿ = 0)=F(K;Hj￿ = 1) ￿ 1:
Column (4) shows the predicted output di⁄erence between autarky (￿ = 1),
and applying the tari⁄ rate given by the World Bank data:
F(K;Hj￿ = ￿i)=F(K;Hj￿ = 1) ￿ 1
2To normalize capital for this callibration, we follow Ferreira-Trejos (2006) to estimate
the balanced growth path for k in a closed-economy standard Cass-Koopmans model with
6.1% net return of capital and 2% annual growth.
8We remove from our sample those countries with high k for which potential
gains from trade represent less than 1%.
<< Insert Tables 1.1. to 1.4>>
We present together as Group 1 countries with relatively high capital-
labor ratios, for whom the potential increase in productivity from autarky
to free trade is small (say, less than 10%). The tari⁄s necessary, at those
higher levels of k, to prevent trade altogether are not so large; notice that,
for example, Mexico, Barbados and Cyprus have tari⁄s under 20%, yet they
miss all their gains from trade in 1985 according to our model.3 Nevertheless,
some of these countries, with really low tari⁄s, do specialize somewhat and
reap bene￿ts from trade, as in the cases of Ireland, Hong Kong or Poland.
On the other extreme, the sixteen countries in Group 2 are very poor
(the lowest k in the sample), so their gains from trade are very large (over
40%). In the case of Mozambique, for instance, which in 1985 had 1/72 of
the US-EU capital-labor ratio, the productivity hike due to trade can be as
much as 75%.
Interestingly, most of these countries have high tari⁄s; much higher than
in Group 1. Yet, these poor nations get to enjoy most of their potential
gains from trade. Why? Because their factor endowment is very di⁄erent
from that of the Center with which they trade, so the barriers to trade that
would be necessary to drive them to autarky are just immense. Hence, even
with a relatively high ￿ those countries still remain fully specialized in the
production of A, the labor-intensive good, which is the e¢ cient allocation of
capital and labor among the intermediate industries when you are that poor.
With k = 0:04, as several of those countries have, a tari⁄in excess of 100% is
necessary to induce the production of any amount of B, the capital-intensive
good. Even with high barriers to trade,which induce a very ine¢ cient choice
of a and b by ￿nal good producers, the allocation of K and H among the
intermediate goods is not a⁄ected in these cases. Almost all sub-Saharan
countries in our sample are in that situation.
Group 3 contains ten countries that are low-to-middle income, with size-
able potential gains from trade, and for whom barriers to trade imply a
signi￿cant loss. Notice for instance that Bangladesh, the country with the
highest tari⁄ in our sample, could get a 36% boost in productivity from free
3For instance, with the capital/labor ratio of Mexico, a tari⁄ of 16% is enough to rule
out trade.
9trade, yet wastes three quarters of that potential loss due to protectionism.
India, Pakistan and Colombia are not very far behind. Finally, neither here
nor there, the 26 nations in Group 4 have lower tari⁄s, enjoy signi￿cant ben-
e￿ts from international trade, yet also waste a non-negligible fraction of that
potential.
4.1 Productivity decomposition
The fact that countries with very di⁄erent factor endowments to the Center
are trading with it, and obtaining a productivity gain from that trade (that
is not enjoyed by the richer nations, at least not in a similar scale), implies
that TFP decompositions that ignore the e⁄ects of this type of trade would
yield a higher TFP residual for many nations; perhaps quite a bit higher, as
suggested by the numbers that we saw above. Now, we try to see the size of
this di⁄erence.
The usual approach yields
Y = b ￿K
￿H
1￿￿
where b ￿ = ￿￿￿ - and is usually labeled TFP in level decomposition exercises




If an economy is in autarky, then ￿￿ = ￿1 = 1, and thus b ￿ = ￿: However, if
tari⁄s are low enough, then ￿￿ > 1, and thus one may overestimate the true
TFP; ￿; if one ignores the impact of international trade.









Now, if the country does trade, and thus reaps the gains from trade, we can












We use this expression in a otherwise standard level decomposition exercise,

























The two ￿rst components in the right hand side are standard in level
decomposition exercises; ￿rst comes the e⁄ect of di⁄erent levels of capital
per e¢ ciency unit of labor, and then the amount of e¢ ciency units of labor
per worker. i.e., human capital. The product of the last two components is
b ￿, what usually appears for productivity, which we separate in Tables 2.1
to 2.4 between the trade-related part and the residual productivity, for our
sample4. Countries are arranged in the same groups as in Table 1.
<< Insert Tables 2.1 to 2.4 >>
As expected, the relatively well-o⁄ countries in Group 1 (not to mention
the even better-o⁄countries that were deleted from the sample) display very
low levels of ￿￿. Therefore, estimates of b ￿ obtained ignoring trade are very
similar to those of ￿. There are still some exceptions: very open economies
where gains from trade are not negligible, like Panama, Hong Kong, Ireland
or Trinidad. Similarly, for some of the countries in Group 3 it is also the
case that b ￿ is very close to ￿, not because there are few gains from trade
to be obtained, but rather because the high ￿ implies low ￿￿. In fact, the
correlation between ￿ and b ￿ is high for the overall sample.
Nevertheless, in the other two groups, productivity is signi￿cantly overes-
timated by assessing b ￿. In the very poor countries of Group 2 trade matters
a lot. In the case of Mozambique and Rwanda, for instance, b ￿ is almost
twice as large than ￿; because the measured gains from trade are huge. In no
country in this group ￿￿ was found to be smaller than 40%; so the discrepancy
between measured and trade-corrected TFP. Similarly, for those countries in
Group 4 enough trade takes place, for the usual measure of TFP, b ￿, to
be quite an overestimation of ￿. Guatemala and Jordan, for instance, two
countries that usually surprise in standard TFP measures, resemble much
more closely others with similar income once a correction for trade is made.
What about the opposite question: Are the losses of productivity from im-
posing trade barriers signi￿cant relative to overall TFP? We calculate ￿0￿￿￿
4For simplicity we called the ￿rst component of the expression above k and the second
h:The latter measure the impact of H=L after account for di⁄erences in K=H:
11and compare it to 1=￿ ￿ 1, to verify if the productivity increase that could
have been obtained by trade liberalization in 1985 was a large component of
the overall productivity di⁄erence for these countries. We know that, relative
to their own output, gains from trade liberalization are large. Are they large
relative to the distance that these countries must make up? The answer, not
surprisingly, is that for most countries, TFP losses due to the undone trade
liberalization are not large relative to their productivity backwardness. In
Group 1, this is the case because the gains to be ripped from trade are not
large. In Group 2, because most of those gains are enjoyed anyway. Never-
theless, it is the case that in Groups 3 and 4, additional trade liberalization
could make up for a signi￿cant fraction of the TFP di⁄erentials: 10% of
them, on average, for Group 3, around 20% for Bangladesh and Colombia,
and at least 4% for 13 countries in total.
4.2 2000 data
Between 1985 and 2000 most countries in the world experienced aggressive
trade liberalization. In our sample of developing countries, average tari⁄
dropped from 27% to 13% in the period, while the coe¢ cient of variation -
the ratio between variance and mean - went from 10.1 to 3.0. Not surprisingly,
the number of countries that wasted a signi￿cant share of their potential gains
from trade decreased. For instance, average nominal tari⁄in Bangladesh fell
to 21.6% from 94.5% in the period. Hence, while in 1985 it lost more than
three quarters of the potential gains from trade, in 2000 it reap them all.
Nonetheless, there is still a group of middle-income countries - with rel-
atively high capital-labor ratios - that lose a large part of their potential
gains from trade (e.g., Brazil, Malaysia, Thailand, Hungary, etc.). As seen
before, the potential increase in productivity from autarky to free trade is
small in this case and the tari⁄s necessary to prevent trade are not large.
Some countries such as Mexico, Iran and Cyprus did not improve at all and
still miss all bene￿ts from trade.
However, there are marked changes. Because tari⁄s are now much lower,
there is a group of countries - for instance, India and Pakistan, in addition
to Bangladesh - that used to miss these gains from trade in the past but now
bene￿t from it. Although tari⁄s are still relatively high - in all three cases
well above the average 2000 tari⁄ - they are now low enough so that, given
their relative low k, these countries are not shut down from trade as in the
past.
125 Conclusion
In this paper we presented evidence that gains from trade are very relevant.
We used a very simple dynamic version of the Hecksher-Ohlin model so that
the only reason countries trade are factor di⁄erences. This contrasts with
Eaton and Kurtum (2002) Ricardian trade model in which there is a contin-
uum of goods and countries have di⁄erential access to technology. In that
model e¢ ciency varies across commodities and countries. As opposed to
Rodriguez-Clare (2006), which builds on Eaton and Kurtun(2002), there is
no di⁄usion in our model. Nonetheless, the model is able to capture some
important features of the international comerce - poor countries do trade
because of factor di⁄erences - and so our measured gains from trade may be
be seen as a (large) lower bound of the gains from openness. As a matter
of fact, they are very close to those Rodriguez-Clare (2006) obtained in the
pure trade model.
Moreover, the methodology we use does not capture the fact that barriers
to trade do a⁄ect investment decisions and so capital stocks, something we
have shown in a previous paper (Ferreira and Trejos (2006)). In this sense,
the current exercise is also limited as it takes stocks as given but does not
consider that, if it were not for trade restrictions, they would be considerably
larger.
Of course, the fact that poor countries with high tari⁄s are still enjoying
most of the gains from trade could be reverted if we have more realistic data,
and not only nominal tari⁄s data. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) survey
the literature on trade costs and show that for the OECD economies they
are quite large and well above nominal tari⁄s. We wanted, however, to use
homogeneous data and the only source we know for this is the WorldBank
database on nominal tari⁄. A natural extension of this work is to use (and
construct in some cases) data of trade cost based on gravitation models for
a large set of economies.
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14A.1 Gains from Trade, 1985
Group 1: Richer countries with small gains from trade
Country K/H ￿(%) Pot.Gains (%) Realized (%)
Barbados 0,60 17,30 2.,81 -
Brazil 0,57 47,00 3,33 -
Cyprus 0,67 12,80 1,69 -
Ecuador 0,38 34,30 9,25 -
Hong Kong 0,49 - 5,18 5,18
Hungary 0,54 24,00 3,86 -
Iran 0,58 20,70 3,06 -
Ireland 0,65 8,70 2,02 1,15
Mexico 0,59 19,70 2,93 -
Panama 0,37 12,80 9,64 8,46
Peru 0,51 37,60 4,68 -
Poland 0,48 13,40 5,70 3,81
South Africa 0,57 21,20 3,37 -
Trindad and Tobago 0,38 17,20 8,97 6,35
Tunisia 0,46 25,90 6,15 -
Uruguay 0,50 36,30 5,07 -
15Group 2: Very poor countries with large gains from trade
Country K/H ￿(%) Pot.Gains (%) Realized (%)
Benin 0,04 48,30 51,22 48,34
Central African Republic 0,04 32,00 48,49 47,07
China 0,05 49,50 46,06 43,16
Congo 0,03 22,60 59,00 58,18
Guinea Bisseau 0,06 27,80 42,60 41,54
Haiti 0,03 27,70 57,97 56,80
Lesotho 0,04 17,40 50,87 50,38
Malawi 0,04 31,60 48,63 47,24
Mali 0,06 17,00 42,79 42,36
Mozambique 0,01 15,60 75,54 75,08
Nepal 0,05 21,90 46,74 46,02
Niger 0,05 18,50 44,35 43,83
Rwanda 0,02 33,00 71,98 70,24
Senegal 0,06 13,20 42,74 42,46
Sierra Leone 0,02 25,80 66,83 65,74
Togo 0,04 19,50 51,03 50,44
Group 3: Low-to-middle income countries that waste signi￿cant
gains due to tari⁄s
Country K/H ￿(%) Pot.Gains (%) Realized (%)
Bangladesh 0,08 94,50 35,82 8,60
Chile 0,32 20,80 11,69 8,69
Colombia 0,25 35,70 15,73 7,97
Egypt 0,14 47,40 25,71 20,07
Honduras 0,14 51,30 26,30 18,87
India 0,06 91,00 40,80 24,41
Korea 0,33 21,00 11,55 8,41
Mauritius 0,22 36,20 17,88 11,41
Pakistan 0,09 72,20 33,36 20,29
Thailand 0,21 38,10 19,23 12,80
16Group 4: Developing countries with somewhat freer trade policy
Country K/H ￿(%) Pot.Gains (%) Realized (%)
Bolivia 0,18 17,60 21,71 21,31
Botswana 0,21 30,00 18,96 16,45
Cameron 0,09 30,20 34,45 33,29
Costa Rica 0,28 19,50 14,07 12,64
Dominican Republic 0,21 27,80 19,26 17,98
El Salvador 0,17 20,00 22,01 21,50
Fiji 0,32 12,40 11,67 11,23
Ghana 0,07 26,30 38,12 37,19
Guatemala 0,22 19,40 18,33 17,86
Guyana 0,33 18,70 11,49 9,17
Indonesia 0,09 30,20 34,67 33,51
Jamaica 0,34 17,90 10,83 8,52
Jordan 0,28 15,20 13,77 13,49
Kenya 0,07 39,90 39,48 37,54
Malaysia 0,31 14,00 12,15 11,50
Nicaragua 0,23 22,10 17,29 16,71
Papua New Guinea 0,19 14,20 21,02 20,75
Paraguay 0,21 11,00 18,98 18,82
Philippines 0,18 29,20 21,53 20,54
Sri Lanka 0,08 36,20 36,03 34,42
Syria 0,26 14,80 15,51 15,23
Taiwan 0,25 23,30 15,79 13,95
Tanzania 0,07 28,50 39,00 37,91
Turkey 0,23 27,90 17,48 14,84
Zambia 0,17 29,90 22,47 21,43
Zimbabwe 0,35 9,40 10,61 10,45
17A.2 Productivity Decomposition, 1985
Group 1: Richer countries with small gains from trade
Country y k h b ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿
Barbados 49,0% 84,2% 68,9% 71,2% 0,0% 71,2%
Brazil 38,3% 82,9% 47,3% 81,0% 0,0% 81,0%
Cyprus 48,7% 87,6% 71,0% 68,6% 0,0% 68,6%
Ecuador 30,8% 72,3% 51,2% 60,1% 0,0% 60,1%
Hong Kong 55,8% 79,0% 70,1% 79,6% 5,2% 75,7%
Hungary 44,6% 81,7% 76,0% 58,6% 0,0% 58,6%
Iran 36,1% 83,6% 47,3% 76,3% 0,0% 76,3%
Ireland 68,2% 86,5% 72,7% 93,8% 1,1% 92,8%
Mexico 55,2% 83,9% 55,8% 98,9% 0,0% 98,9%
Panama 39,8% 71,7% 54,1% 73,5% 8,5% 67,8%
Peru 32,9% 80,0% 57,2% 57,6% 0,0% 57,6%
Poland 29,6% 78,1% 71,9% 41,2% 3,8% 39,7%
South Africa 55,6% 82,8% 55,6% 100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
Trindad & Tobago 62,0% 72,7% 56,4% 110,0% 6,3% 103,4%
Tunisia 36,3% 77,3% 43,3% 83,7% 0,0% 83,7%
Uruguay 37,9% 79,2% 61,4% 61,6% 0,0% 61,6%
18Group 2: Very poor countries with large gains from trade
Country y k h b ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿
Benin 6,0% 33,9% 16,1% 37,2% 48,3% 25,1%
Central Africa Repub 7,4% 35,4% 16,9% 43,9% 47,1% 29,9%
China 6,0% 36,8% 23,9% 25,1% 43,2% 17,5%
Congo 3,9% 30,2% 15,9% 24,5% 58,2% 15,5%
Guinea Bisseau 2,7% 38,9% 16,9% 15,8% 41,5% 11,2%
Haiti 5,4% 30,7% 16,6% 32,3% 56,8% 20,6%
Lesotho 6,5% 34,1% 20,0% 32,4% 50,4% 21,5%
Malawi 3,5% 35,3% 18,9% 18,4% 47,2% 12,5%
Mali 6,5% 38,8% 17,1% 37,8% 42,4% 26,6%
Mozambique 3,5% 24,0% 10,7% 32,4% 75,1% 18,5%
Nepal 5,7% 36,4% 16,9% 33,7% 46,0% 23,1%
Niger 4,2% 37,8% 16,8% 24,9% 43,8% 17,3%
Rwanda 5,1% 25,2% 12,4% 40,7% 70,2% 23,9%
Senegal 8,2% 38,8% 19,7% 41,5% 42,5% 29,1%
Sierra Leone 7,6% 27,0% 13,3% 57,4% 65,7% 34,6%
Togo 7,3% 34,0% 18,1% 40,5% 50,4% 27,0%
Group 3: Low-to-middle income countries that waste signi￿cant
gains due to tari⁄s
Country y k h b ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿
Bangladesh 9,7% 43,6% 21,9% 44,2% 8,6% 40,7%
Chile 33,3% 68,7% 52,3% 63,7% 8,7% 58,7%
Colombia 32,2% 63,2% 39,9% 80,9% 8,0% 74,9%
Egypt 24,0% 52,2% 30,0% 80,2% 20,1% 66,8%
Honduras 18,0% 51,6% 31,1% 58,0% 18,9% 48,8%
India 8,4% 40,1% 23,1% 36,4% 24,4% 29,3%
Korea 38,3% 68,9% 62,8% 61,0% 8,4% 56,3%
Mauritius 28,8% 60,6% 41,0% 70,1% 11,4% 62,9%
Pakistan 11,5% 45,5% 22,9% 50,4% 20,3% 41,9%
Thailand 15,0% 59,0% 39,2% 38,1% 12,8% 33,8%
19Group 4: Developing countries with somewhat freer trade policy
Country y k h b ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿
Bolivia 19,3% 56,3% 36,1% 53,6% 21,3% 44,2%
Botswana 28,4% 59,3% 34,2% 83,1% 16,4% 71,3%
Cameroon 17,3% 44,6% 23,7% 72,8% 33,3% 54,6%
Costa Rica 31,7% 65,4% 44,3% 71,5% 12,6% 63,4%
Dominican Republic 24,6% 59,0% 35,5% 69,2% 18,0% 58,7%
El Salvador 26,0% 55,9% 32,2% 80,7% 21,5% 66,5%
Fiji 30,8% 68,7% 56,2% 54,8% 11,2% 49,3%
Ghana 7,6% 41,9% 24,1% 31,3% 37,2% 22,8%
Guatemala 29,9% 60,1% 32,2% 92,8% 17,9% 78,8%
Guyama 14,9% 69,0% 47,1% 31,7% 9,2% 29.1%
Indonesia 14,2% 44,5% 26,5% 53,4% 35,5% 40,0%
Jamaica 16,7% 69,9% 43,3% 38,5% 8,5% 35,5%
Jordan 46,4% 65,8% 43,8% 106,1% 13,5% 93,5%
Kenya 6,9% 41,0% 23,0% 30,1% 37,5% 21,9%
Malaysia 32,6% 68,0% 46,5% 70,1% 11,5% 62,0%
Nicaragua 23,4% 61,3% 34,7% 67,4% 16,7% 57,8%
Papua New Guinea 15,2% 57,0% 28,4% 53,3% 20,8% 44,2%
Paraguay 31,1% 59,3% 39,4% 78,8% 18,8% 66,3%
Philippines 18,0% 56,4% 43,0% 41,8% 20,5% 34,7%
Sri Lanka 12,9% 43,4% 30,7% 42,0% 34,4% 31,3%
Syria 29,5% 63,5% 39,7% 74,3% 15,2% 64,5%
Taiwan 41,5% 63,2% 52,1% 79,7% 13,9% 69,9%
Tanzania 3,1% 41,3% 22,3% 13,8% 37,9% 10,0%
Turkey 26,7% 61,1% 35,5% 75,3% 14,8% 65,6%
Zambia 7,7% 55,4% 33,1% 23,2% 21,4% 19,1%
Zimbabwe 17,4% 70,3% 37,3% 46,6% 10,4% 42,2%
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